Ontological dimensions of post-foundational political thought and Reinvention of the Political

Mohammad Bahrampour: PhD. Student of Political Thought, Faculty of Political Science, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran.

bahrampour.m@ut.ac.ir

Ali Ashraf Nazari: Associate Professor; Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran(Corresponding Author).

aashraf@ut.ac.ir

Abstract: They seek to reinterpret, in a process of dialogue and exchange, the foundations that have come to them as givens or precipitated in democratic societies, within the framework of temporal changes. In this way, a new experience has opened up for us from Western thought. Now the main question is whether it is possible to find a fixed foundation in this type of thought in which change in that is not recognized? By examining these ideas, and focusing on the thoughts of two important thinkers, John Rawls and Ernesto Laclau, we find that there are dimensions of political ontology among these ideas that are considered as red lines. Dimensions that can be called democratic political ontology. Now, in the next step, we should ask ourselves whether this experience can be used in defining The Islamic Political or not? By examining this type of political thought, we can claim that there is a way to present an Islamic political ontology and ultimately create a concept of The Islamic political. In a way that both religious principles are taken into account and changes in Muslim societies are recognized and, so to speak, channeled. In this article, this possibility is examined and the extraction of the foundations of Islamic political ontology is postponed to another text.

Introduction

Foundationalism in epistemology seeks to build ideas on the basis of accepted self-evident propositions. In this view, the main ideas are first proven and the rest of the results are obtained by assuming them. However, the anti-foundationalist turn, by denying the existence of such fundamental and unchangeable ideas, as it shifted the boundaries of philosophy, also had a profound impact on politics. The concept of the political is, in some readings, one of the side effects of this abandonment of foundations and the establishment of new foundations based on contingency. The political, by marking "us/them", seeks to present a competitive image in the political space of societies. The field of the political is related to the construction of society, accompanied by conflict that has always existed and cannot be eradicated.

Oliver Marchart, in his book Post-Foundational Political Thought (2007), pays attention to the post-structuralist political, looking at the two areas of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. Post-foundational politics is a movement that seeks to benefit from both fundamentalism and anti-foundationalism. Post-foundational thinkers try to free themselves from foundationalism and anti-foundationalism by presenting a provisional concept of a value foundation in politics. Marchart refers in his book to the ideas of Jean-Luc Nancy, Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou, and Ernesto Laclau. Post-foundational thinkers try to link the permanent change in postmodernism to the change in the foundations considered by the foundationalists. They try to consider a provisional foundation for the political.

In this middle, two thinkers are important. Ernesto Laclau and John Rawls. They consider individuals in human communities as "here and now" and seek answers to various questions in the social arena, such as how to create a stable society and implement justice in it, and how to create societies in the shadow of antagonism. These political thinkers seek to build politics on a foundationless basis and claim that the solutions presented in political discussions are temporary results to achieve temporary goals.

John Rawls, claiming to free his thought from any kind of foundatioalism in so-called comprehensive ideas, considers the

political culture hidden in democratic societies as the basis of political action and by creating a concept such as reasonableness

in addition to rationality, tried to distance himself from the modernist basis of liberalism around man and society. Rawls keeps the way open for policy change and considers decision-making in the field of politics as a process, contingent and dependent on time and place. On the other hand, Ernesto Laclau seeks to analyze social antagonisms. Laclau, like Rawls, seeks to analyze conditions in society that are variable but necessary. Conditions on the basis of which politics emerges and communities continue on their path.

Now we must ask ourselves whether we can find in this type of thought dimensions of political ontology in which change has not entered and that change intended by these thinkers is not recognized in it? By examining the thoughts of these two thinkers, and of course in a more general scheme, in examining post-foundational thoughts, a point becomes clear. It seems that in this type of thought, there are ontological assumptions that trap their political thought in the same current from which they claim to be free. Assumptions that we can call democratic political ontology and the special perception of this type of thought of the democratic subject and world lead us to call this type of politics democratic politics.

The examination of post-foundational thoughts and the innovation in identifying the dimensions of democratic political ontology within this type of thought, with a look at the thought of Rawls and Laclau, opens the way for the initiative of this article, namely, taking advantage of this experience in Western political thought, to define a concept of The Islamic Political. Because this type of political thought both accepts changes in the foundations and has ontological foundations that organize those changes. With this aim, namely, assessing the feasibility of reaching an additional concept of the political and the hypothesis of confirming this possibility of presenting the concept of The Islamic Political, this article first presents a definition of political ontology, based on the two concepts of the subject and its world, and then discusses the characteristics of the political, and then describes post-foundational ideas. Through these steps, by examining the ideas of John Rawls and Ernesto Laclau, as two

main examples of this movement, who have also been able to present political structures, it examines their ontological assumptions. Finally, this article suggests that we can benefit from the experiences of post-foundationalist ideas and, in the subject of The Islamic political, we can use Islamic ontological assumptions within the framework of Islamic discourse and arrive at The Islamic political.

1. Political Ontology, Subject, and Its World

Ontology means the theory of existence, and the roots of the word go back to being and logos in the Greek language. That is, the knowledge of existence. In philosophy, ontology has been used to investigate the fundamental categories of existence and the relationship between them. (Rosenthal. 2018: 7). Ontology, in its simplest sense, deals with the analysis of the existence of beings, and when the analysis of existence enters the field of politics, we are dealing with concepts such as the individual, society, and the mutual influence of the two on the institutions that are built or arise in the political and social spheres.

This ontology, which we call political ontology, is based on the distinction that Heidegger makes between fundamental ontology and Regional ontology. In his view, Regional ontology is that ontology that investigates a specific type of being. Political ontology deals with beings who, in a group of people, seek to create a utopian, efficient, orderly, safe, or... city. This ontology presupposes the existence of these individuals and that city from the beginning (Beistegui, 1389: 49-50). Therefore, in political ontology, we will not seek to focus solely on fundamental ontology. In political ontology, we seek those things that determine politics: the rulers and the condemned and the world of governance. We can call the rulers and the condemned, subjects. Subject and subjectivity are constructed through their connection with the external world. Even a subject who relies on pure human experience and reason, such as Hayy ibn Yaqzan, was forced to be present in a group of people in order to understand his identity and duties. He was unable to understand his own intuitions. When Absal explained the qualities of the Sharia to him, "Hayy ibn Yaqzan accepted those duties and began to look around, and committed himself to fulfilling religious duties in accordance with the order that he considered to be true" (Ibn Tufail, 1334:146). That is, he became a

"believer who observes the supermaterial and worships and complies with the orders of the Messenger of God."

Subjects are not constructed solely through religious orders. Freedom from religious orders and reaching the island of human reason was one of the purposes of the subject. People like Immanuel Kant paved the way. They claimed that man could be a legislator. A law that applies to all and for all. A law that is fair and just for the individual and others.

In parallel with Immanuel Kant, another way of thinking is also developing. A way of thinking that does not see everything in the individual ability of a rational man. A rational man must interpret his rationality in the light of the environment in which he finds himself. In this regard, in a section known as Herrschaft und Knechtschaft from his book Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes, "The double meaning of the distinct lies in the essence of self-consciousness, an essence that is for this self-consciousness infinite or directly the opposite of the determination in which it is posited. The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity, while simultaneously being dualistic, represents to us the movement of recognition. For self-consciousness, there is another self-consciousness; self-consciousness has come outside itself. This has a double implication; first, self-consciousness has lost itself, because it finds itself as an other essence; second, it thus resolves and eliminates the other, because it does not see the other as an essence, but rather sees itself in the other" (Seyd-Ahmadian, 1394: 142).

The debate between the rational, willful subject on the one hand and the subject subservient to structure on the other continued into the twentieth century. Authors like Louis Althusser, within the framework of structuralism, identified ideological state apparatuses that could educate the subject. An apparatus that, according to Antonio Gramsci, imposed the cultural hegemony of the state on the subject. But at the other end of the spectrum, existentialists also held views that were completely at odds with the structuralist view. As Donald E. Hall puts it of Sartre, "The first effect of existentialism is that it places man at its disposal as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence entirely on his shoulders" (Hall, 1399: 109).

In the wake of these developments, psychological theories of the subject were also presented. Sigmund Freud interpreted the subject as confined to the unconscious and claimed that psychoanalysis had the ability to reveal and resolve problems. In contrast, Jacques Lacan saw this psychoanalysis as permanent and the construction of the subject as a continuous and infinite process. On the other hand, philosophers such as Michel Foucault conceptualized this infinite process by presenting the concept of discourse (Hall. 1399).

From this brief historical course, it is clear that in fact, change in the world leads to change in the subject and its concept. The subject itself can affect the world, but change in the world inevitably has an irreversible effect on the concept of the subject. As Donald E. Hall puts it, "Indeed, a key component to understanding the changing nature of subjectivity is how the concept of the self is transformed over time by changing economic and material conditions, as well as by specific and emerging prejudices, social injustices, and hypocrisies" (Hall, 1399: 65). In short, the subject is produced by his world, which can aim at a high ideal or at a low one. For example, Dominique Laporte, in The History of Shit, explores the construction of the subject by something worthless but valuable at some times. He writes, "The decree of 1539, together with the decree of 1536, by requiring each individual and each family to keep their personal waste in their home before transporting it to the city, illuminates the grounds for the formation of individuality and the modern private sphere in an unprecedented way" (Laporte, 2019: 47). the orders issued about it constitute the subject as pure and impure. The subject emerges through the orders imposed on him in society. These orders are imposed on the subject in a field called The Political.

On the other hand, in Islamic political thought, the issue of ontology and the issue of the Subject and its world is a clear and obvious one. From the beginning, an ontology based on the existence of a resourceful deity with the attribute of Lord and Sustainer is drawn. This Lord and Sustainer God, guides the creatures who need to receive guidance, of the Most Merciful Lord and Sustainer, in order to reach their perfection. And the prophets who bring the divine message to order people and their world have important role in this ontology.

In this space, the first name that comes to mind in the field of coherent political philosophy is Al-Al-Farabi. According to Al-Farabi's cosmology, humans live in a hierarchical world and in order to organize their societies, they need to communicate with upper world. A communication that only certain people can do. In this way, the Subject needs a world in which he can perfect himself, and he achieves this perfection when he is obedient to the orders of the person who is in contact with the upper world. In this way, Al-Farabi's political ontology is clear: the subject needs wise guidance in a world full of imperfections. (Al-Farabi. 1379H)

Such an attitude is repeated in Mulla Sadra. According to him, there is a hierarchy between the mass of people, scholars of the Ummah, guardians and imams, prophets, angels and God, from the lowest level of existence to the highest level. In such a hierarchy, a person who needs happiness and law, in order to obtain it, needs to communicate with his higher hierarchy, that is, revelation. In this view, in order to reach the human perfection, people with more prominent human characters are responsible for guiding the human society. In general, the headship and governance of human societies and the implementation of Sharia laws are the responsibility of the prophet as the divine caliph in the world and then his successors, that is, parents, scholars and mujtahids. And these superior people are the ones who can bring the laws governing world from the upper world to the lower world and put other people on the path of growth and excellence. (Miandhi and Sharifi. 1397H: 162-163).

Islamic political thought in Iran, in recent years and under the influence of philosophical changes in the West, has also been forced to change its attitudes. Turning towards democratization and trying to create a convergence between democracy and Islam, is one of the results of philosophical changes in the Western world, which has also affected the Occident. But these efforts, rather than focusing on ontology, have been based on methods of integration between Islam and new ways of governance. The use of concepts such as council, allegiance and representation are among the methods that have been adopted to create closeness between Islamic political thought and new political currents in the West.

If we look for the major political ideas presented in the Islamic discourse in recent centuries, we come across titles such as constitutional government, Islamic Republic, or religious democracy. Naini, in his book Tanbih ul Ummah wa Tanzih Ul Melleh, justifies the presence of people in politics based on the Shura (council) principle. According to Naini, error in the majority vote is allowed and this is allowed based on the life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and Amir al-Mu'minin Ali (PBUH). Therefore, in Naini's political ontology, people are allowed to change their world. But it also points out that the Shura (council) must be within religious boundaries (Feirahi. 1394H).

Mehdi Bazargan, as a main figure in the current of Liberal political Islam, has also used the metaphor of the Shura (council) to refer to the right of the people to determine their own destiny (Hosseinizadeh. 1385H: 203-205). On the other hand, in Ali Shariati's view, the leadership of the nation is the responsibility of someone who is a superior. He neither needs people's approval nor is he answerable to them. But in this system, there is a need for the existence of a Shura (council) that can provide its popularity (ibid: 217). In the Velayat Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) theory, to which the Islamic Republic and Religious Democracy are dependent, attention has been paid to democratic methods in governance. Imam Khomeini was able to promote the presence of political Islam in society and the role of people in Islamic politics by presenting the theory of Velayat Faqih.

In his analysis of Imam Khomeini's thought, Davood Feirahi refers to Imam Khomeini's style of governance to the metaphor of judgment and says, "The first assumption in the government based on the metaphor of judgment is to rely on a free, wise and faithful man" (Feirhi. 1394H: 497). He continues, "The second analytical element in the government based on the metaphor of judgment is the society of the wise [a society comprised of wise people]" (ibid: 498). And finally, he says, "It seems that Imam Khomeini's conception of society is based on a different understanding [from the point of view of the lack of perfection in society and the need for guardianship] ... which we mentioned as the society of the wise" (ibid: 500). In describing the society of the wise, Feirahi says, "The society of the wise is not a limited and incomplete; rather, due to its maturity, wisdom and freedom, it

not only enjoys many rights and powers, but also manages these rights directly or indirectly by representation" (ibid.: 502).

Despite paying attention to the political ontology in Imam Khomeini's thought, Feirahi considers the main problem of not referring to the principles of democracy in Islamic political thought in Iran to be the type of authoritarian government (ibid: 508). A concept that focuses more on the mechanism of exercising power and does not reveal the ontological foundations as well.

2. The Political

Although the concept of the political is linked to Carl Schmitt's work, the consistency of this idea came after the post-structuralist movement and the separation between what is and what is becoming. Based on the existing literature on the political, three characteristics can be considered for this concept. First, the antagonistic aspect of the political. In this way, the political is the opposition between us and them. Emphasizing Laclau's thought and regarding the ontological level of identity construction, Saul Newman says: "On the ontological level, a social identity can only define itself through the exclusion of a specific element." (Newman ,1401, 77). With this description, the second characteristic of the political is its constant change. The political is created in a constant flow between concepts that become hegemoni or become hegemonic. Such a changeable characteristic of the political is known by terms such as contingency and undecidability. And the third characteristic of the political is its dialogic nature. In modern political literature, political change occurs through dialogue and exchange of opinions. This feature is recognized in the distinction between antagonism and agonism. In the former, the confrontation between us and them occurs on a terrain that provides the possibility of conflict. But in the latter, this confrontation becomes competition. A competition that is based on initially agreed principles.

These agreed principles have been considered under different titles over the years. Various schools of thought have emerged to analyze and examine these agreed principles. The most important of these tendencies is the constancy and changeability of these principles in their eyes. Some believe that politics is based on principles such as human reason or collective wisdom or historical determinism.

Principles that are indisputable. On the other hand, some consider these principles unattainable and change permanent and believe that a phenomenon such as democracy is unattainable and will come in the future. These schools of thought are categorized into Foundationalism and anti- Foundationalism. There is also a third trend, which is called post- Foundationalism.

Now, the main question of this article is to what extent can this historical experience of politics be useful for us in producing a concept that is complementary to The political, for example, The Religious Political? This article seeks to present the hypothesis that the experience of Western thought in this field can be a guide to The political in the Islamic world. The political that has been crystallized in the field of consultation with subjects, and then the limited council of the people of the settlement and in the contemporary era with the theory of the Islamic Republic in the creation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. A look at the basic currents in politics will help to present a concept that is not inconsistent with the sources of inferring religious rulings. This is achieved by examining The political in Western thought and proving its complementary nature. The goal that we are pursuing in this article is to be able to state that The complementary political, which can also be called democratic, can be an intellectual source for producing a similar concept of The religious political for us. The following are the premises of this goal and finally, in the conclusion section, we will talk about The religious political.

3. Foundationalism, Anti- Foundationalism and Post-Foundationalism

Tom Rockmore, regarding anti-foundationalist ideas and in the introduction to his book entitled Anti-foundationalism. Old and New, he says, "The meaning of anti-foundationalism is in the air, it is part of the current philosophical discussion; but it is unclear what it means and there is a danger that the inquiry is moving faster than the comprehension of the topic. The chaotic state of the discussion is indicated by the burgeoning literature about it, which seems to be developing exceedingly rapidly in comparison with the philosophical tradition, where discussions often continue for centuries. In just the recent literature antifoundationalism at one time or another has been

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associated with an almost bewildering assortment of current trends, including, in no particular order, incommensurability, hermeneutics, objectivism, relativism, postmodernism, forms of literary theory, deconstruction, and so on, and with writers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Jean-Francois Lyotard.." (Rockmore, 1992: 2). Rockmore continues and says that Antifoundationalism and foundationalism are correlative concepts. Just as there are metaphysical and epistemological varieties of foundationalism, there are metaphysical and epistemological varieties of anti-foundationalism. In contrast to metaphysical foundationalism, epistemological anti-foundationalism denies any kind of higher reality or fundamental kind of being. Although this denial is not necessarily expressed in epistemological statements. (Rockmore 1992: 5-6)

What is important about the definition of foundationalism is the existence of a fundamental ontological principle for the analysis of political affairs, the absence of which is assumed in anti-foundationalist thought. But there have been attempts to link this being and non-being. In the field of political ontology, this connection between the two approaches has occurred with the emergence of so-called post-foundationalist thought. Authors like of Laclau, Nancy, and Mouffe, and of course John Rawls, seek to establish a fundamental principle that changes over time. Describing this view, Marchart notes, What distinguishes the former from the latter is that it does not assume the absence of any ground; what it assumes is the absence of an ultimate ground, since it is only on the basis of such absence that grounds, in the plural, are possible. (Marchart 2007: 14). According to this definition, poststructuralist thought does not deny the existence of the principle of fundamentals or foundations, but rather, based on its analysis of social existence and defining it with concepts such as contingency, moment, event, possibility, undecidability, and hegemony, it sees society as an identity in constant flux.

In general, post-foundationalists consider a temporary foundation and extend change to foundations. These three principles can be considered as characteristics of post-foundationalism: 1.

Temporality: In post-foundationalist thought, the existence of the foundation is not completely denied. These foundations are considered to belong to the present time. According to Rawlsian literature, they are foundations for the here and now. 2. changeable foundation: The temporary nature of a foundation means that it is changeable. Post-foundationalist thought recognizes this change and opens the way for its change. 3. Dialogue-based change: In post-foundationalist thought, change comes about through the negation and assertion of old and new hegemonic things. Therefore, they have a dialogical nature.

On the other hand, Roberto Esposito, in his book, Instituting Thought: Three Paradigms of Political Ontology (2021), considers post-foundational ideas to be among those that adhere to weak ontology. Also Stephen White has provided criteria for weak ontology. In his book, Sustaining Affirmation (2000), he discusses four common characteristics of ideas based on weak ontologies:

First. A strong ontology has a foundation, such as God and rationality, from which other precepts are derived. The validity of such a foundation is immutable and its reach is universal. Thus, for a strong ontology, the path from questions about ontological truths to moral-political questions is clear and clear, and from the ontological level one can reach the moral-political level (White. 2000: 6). In contrast, a weak ontology states that all foundational concepts of the self, the other, and the world are contestable. And that these contestable concepts are necessary and unavoidable for a political and moral life. (White. 2000: 8) Second. A weak ontology believes in a more stickier subject (ibid. 8). Stephen White says that, for them, the subject is identified with existential realities such as language, mortality, and the articulation of individual resources. And the attempt to arrive at a universal idea about man or the world has always been a constructed thing that cannot free itself from historical dimensions. (Ibid. 9) Third. In weak ontology, because there is no clear idea of the truth about the world, there is an aesthetic and emotional dimension to convince it. Thus, the acceptance of a new ontology does not mean accepting it once and for all and clearly. In this case, it has a gradual dimension.

According to Stephen White, this situation can be described as cultivation. Thus, not only the content, but also the form is subject to

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the cultivation process. (White. 2000: 10-11) Fourth. Since weak ontologies are not based on value foundations, there are no undisputed principles or values about ethics and politics. Thus, multiple rounds of reasoning and reflection must occur in order to discuss and examine these issues. (White. 2000: 11)

Now that we have become familiar with post-foundationalism and some of its characteristics, it is time to look at two examples of post-foundationalist thought to see whether we can find within them traces of foundationalism in the field of political ontology. Of course, this section focuses more on aspects of the thought of these two thinkers that are in line with the purpose of this article. Because the thought of these two thinkers is well-known to the audience.

4. Post-Foundationalism in John Rawls

Rawls's main project is to create a suitable context for justifying the baselessness of liberalism in the postmodern world. By understanding Rawls's subject and its world, this effort becomes more apparent than ever. Rawls's world has two basic assumptions that must be considered before examining other aspects. First, it is a closed society. That is, individuals enter it only by birth and leave it only by death. Second, it is a self-sufficient and complete society. That is, it has within itself all the necessary facilities for pursuing the goals of the individual from birth to death. These assumptions are presented by Rawls in order to be able to analyze his political understanding of justice within the framework of narrow issues. Of course, Rawls, in his book The Law of Peoples, tries to approach the current realities in the world today and also considers other societies that are not organized by the political understanding of justice. In this section, he explicitly states that well ordered societies have a duty to bring unordered societies into the fold of ordered societies (Rawls. 1999b: 105).

The ideal of Rawls' political thought is an well ordered world. Rawls states five characteristics for such a society: first, each individual accepts similar principles of justice and knows that others have accepted those principles as well; second, its basic structure is generally or on logical grounds the implementer of these principles and sees the implementation of these principles in it; third, citizens cooperate with social structures that they consider just. (Rawls, 1996:

35) Elsewhere, Rawls adds two more conditions to these conditions. Thus, the fourth characteristic of an well ordered society is that citizens have comprehensive reasonable, albeit contradictory, doctrines present in overlapping consensus. and fifth, comprehensive unreasonable doctrines (we assume that they always exist in society) do not have the opportunity to subvert the basic principles of justice in society. (Rawls, 1996: 39)

This well-ordered society of Rawls's world, in which politics takes place, is known by a unique concept. He calls it the basic structure of society. The basic structure in society is the subject of Rawls's political concept of justice. This basic structure is the political, economic, and social organizations within society and how they are linked together to form a single system of social cooperation from generation to generation. The basic structure is also such that society becomes a closed and complete society. Closed in that it can only be entered by birth, and complete in that it contains all the means and facilities needed to pursue a full life from birth to death.

The basic structure of political society influences individuals. This is where the Rawlsian subject is constructed. This influence is indirect and also requires non-political structures to respect political values. Rawls sees this society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. For him, a reasonable society is neither a society of saints nor a society of selfish individuals. (Rawls, 1996:54).

Since the basic structure of Rawlsian society is composed of individuals who must be equal and free and cooperate fairly with each other, it is essential to understand this fair cooperation. From Rawls's perspective, a world ordered by a political conception of justice must be a fair system of cooperation. In Rawls's world, such a system has three identity elements. (Rawls, 1996: 21-15) & (Rawls, 1384: 31-26)

First, cooperation is based on rules that everyone accepts as their guide. Second, cooperation involves the idea of fair conditions of cooperation. That is, each person states the principles that they expect others to follow. Fair conditions of cooperation specify the idea of reciprocity: all those who play their part according to recognized rules should benefit according to a common, agreed-upon standard. Third, cooperation is based on the good of each party. That is, the benefit or rational good of each participant is provided.

On the other hand, the Rawlsian subject has characteristics that, by knowing them, his duty, and of course his rights, are determined in the Rawlsian world. As the first characteristic of the Rawlsian subject, it can be said that the Rawlsian subject act in accordance with the principle of fairness. Since John Rawls' theory is justice as fairness, this idea is a fundamental concept in his system of thought.

Of course, the limitation inherent in the principle of fairness goes beyond mutual benefit. Because, according to the principle of fairness, the limited individual may no longer be able to obtain the benefit resulting from his limitation that has been granted to others. (Rawls, 1996: 17) & (ibid.: 48-49) What is obtained from the concept of fairness in Rawls's thought is adherence to the individual's obligations in society. These obligations may even lead to the individual's loss, but elsewhere they lead to his benefit. Even if they are not corresponding. Acceptance of these obligations is a type of wisdom that determines another attribute of the subject.

In addition to being fair, the Rawlsian subject must also be reasonable. The first important distinction in understanding a reasonable subject is the difference between being reasonable and being rational. John Rawls defines a reasonable person as someone who fulfills his obligations. On the other hand, a rational person, according to Rawls, is someone who ignores his obligations when circumstances change and seeks to maximize his own interests. (Ibid.: 51)

John Rawls considers subjects to be rational in having a concept of the good and considers their reasonableness on the following three characteristics: First, citizens are reasonable when they cooperate with each other in a two-way interaction and in an well ordered society. (Rawls, 1996: 53-48) The second characteristic of reasonableness is accepting burdens of judgment. (Ibid.: 58-59) The third characteristic of citizens being reasonable is that reasonable people do not consider exercising political power over others to be reasonable. In this case, if a group claims the superiority of its comprehensive beliefs over others, they should be called un reasonable. (Ibid.: 59-60)

Now, we must ask whether such a subject and world are compatible with the free standing political conception of justice. As an

example, we can mention the issue of religious outlook in society from Rawls's point of view. Rawls provides an example of a religious thought compatible with his political conception in his book The Law of Peoples. He considers Ahmad al-Na'im's view of Islam and its Meccan interpretation as a conception compatible with his political conception. Because in this conception of Islam, jihad means jihad with the ego and not with the infidels. Belief should be referred to the heart and not to the establishment of religious appearances in the world, and the rest continues in the same way. What Rawls has in mind is a "reformed" Islamic belief. (Rawls. 1999: 151) Elsewhere, in response to the question of how a comprehensive doctrine is reasonable, Rawls says, without providing a complete definition, that a comprehensive doctrine must recognize the heavy burdens of judgment and therefore, in addition to other fundamental values, freedom of conscience. (Rawls. 1383: 315)

Although Rawls considers citizens free and equal and provides a list of basic freedoms, he says elsewhere that in the event of a conflict between freedoms, it must be borne in mind that none of the basic freedoms are absolute, because these freedoms may conflict with each other in specific cases, and their claims must be adjusted in such a way as to be compatible with a coherent scheme of freedoms. The aim is to make these adjustments in such a way that at least the more important freedoms related to the proper development and full exercise of the moral powers in the two basic cases are usually compatible with each other. (Rawls, 1383: 177) What does the exercise of moral senses mean? Does it not mean the exercise of a sense of justice? Is not a sense of justice the same collaborator in the political structure and the acceptance of the power of this political system? In this case, does not the freedom of the subject become a victim of his world? Is this consistent with the free-standing claim and the existence of burdens of judgment?

Thus, Rawls prescribes the elimination of dissenting thought. And he explicitly considers it reasonable. He says that the prevention of some comprehensive doctrines is done in two ways. First, because they are contrary to the principles of justice and therefore cannot be recognized as a cooperative member. And second, because this type of doctrines cannot survive in the space of an well-ordered society, and

will disappear by itself. Therefore, this elimination should not be considered prejudiced or unjust. (Ibid.: 195)

It is quite clear. Citizens who do not consider Rawlsian wel-ordered society to be correct or even do not agree with some of its aspects cannot live in Rawlsian world. They are against the idea of good of well-ordered society. It was said that a well-ordered society is a society in which everyone accepts principles that they know others accept and are committed to, and there is also a known social structure and citizens in that society have a sense of justice. As a result, within a well-ordered society there are goals that become common goals among citizens. This well-ordered society itself becomes a good for individuals. First, because of the moral psychology that exists among citizens and second, because it is a way to create a higher good called justice and the foundations of self-esteem. As a result, it can be said that people refer to democratic society as their historical achievement. (Ibid.: 206-201)

Now it is better to ask our questions in the context of Rawls's thought: 1. Does Rawls' political conception have an indisputable foundation? The answer is clearly yes. Rawls considers democratic principles in an well-ordered society to be an indisputable foundation, and by eliminating opposing ideas, he not only does not encounter problems, but also prescribes them and considers them to be completely reasonable and just. Rawls considers these principles to be a historical achievement of humans. Perhaps an end of history for humanity. It is these democratic principles, such as the absence of superior authority and the existence of a horizontal society, that are important in Rawls's thought. In this thought, the existence of this democratic ontology is taken as a premise, and the principles of justice are accepted as part of the common culture in democratic societies. A culture that has been able, according to Rawls, to demonstrate its effectiveness over years. 2. Is the Rawlsian subject a more stickier subject? . By examining the Rawlsian subject, we come to the conclusion that the two attributes of reasonableness and rationality have turned the Rawlsian subject into a Teflon subject. A subject that must have a sense of justice. A subject that must be cooperative and abandon or reinterpret its comprehensive beliefs. This subject is

certainly not a sticky subject. So the answer to this question is negative. In this case, the Rawlsian subject, in addition to being influenced by its environment, must have certain characteristics and set aside some of its cultural characteristics and enter into dialogue. In this case, the Rawlsian subject sees the necessity of abandoning part of its culture.

3 and 4. Does Rawlsian political conception include the acceptance of the processual nature of society or of cycles of reflection and reasoning? In some respects, the answer to this question is yes, in others, it is no. Public reason makes it possible for cycles of reflection and reasoning to occur in a well-ordered society. But accepting a well-ordered society as a historical achievement of humanity evolving towards democracy denies this possibility of a processual nature in society. Rawlsian world is a world that has stopped at the "democratic" point.

By examining these questions and the answers provided to them, we can conclude that Rawlsian thought, in his ontology, tries to show democratic ontology as an eternal moment. Subjects are able to talk, but within a democratic framework. They can have fluid identities, but on condition that they interpret it in a democratic culture. And finally, cycles of reflection and reasoning are considered acceptable when they are based on public reason, that should be democtratic. In this way, democratic ontology will be an indisputable foundation for Rawls.

5. Post-foundationalism in Ernesto Laclau

In Ernesto Laclau's thought, we are faced with a reformulation and redesign of socialism. At least in 1990, when he wrote his book New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times, Laclau and Mouffe were shown to be seeking to redesign socialism and adapt it to postmodern turns, such as the dismantling of universal foundations. He sees this path as paved by two actions. First, accepting the global changes in which we live in such a way that we neither deny them nor distort them to fit our past historical designs. In that case, we would repeat old formulations. The second step is to interrogate the past in order to establish a dialogue between the present and the past, to clarify what problems the current situation has caused in the past. Of course, in this direction, this past should not be considered as an absolute origin, but

rather as a contingent phenomenon, and it is in this case that it is called *tradition* [emphasis added] (Laclau, 1990: 98).

To better understand Laclau's world, it is necessary to know a few concepts. Concepts that he has tried to explain in his various works to make it easier for us to understand the radical and antagonistic political. In Laclau's world, social relations have four characteristics (Laclau. 1990: 31-36). First, they are contingent. Second, social relations are relations dependent on power. Laclau says that an organized society is an impossible society because "power is a condition for the possibility of society (or its impossibility)" (ibid.: 33). The third characteristic of social relations is the priority of the political over the social, which is also consistent with changeability. Laclau has taken help from Husserl to explain the social. Laclau says that for Husserl, forgetting or becoming commonplace of fundamental principles, their sedimentation and recovery, is a new activation. He goes on to say, with a slight modification, that as the contingent nature of social relations disappears, we gradually see social institutions presenting themselves as a form of a completed object, and this is the stage where sedimentation occurs. This can go so far that it no longer leaves any trace of contingent power relations. Laclau calls these sedimented forms of objectification the social. And he considers the moment of antagonism, that is, the undecidable nature of alternatives and their finalization through power relations, the domain of the political (ibid.: 35).

In addition to the third characteristic, namely changeability, the fourth characteristic of social relations is their radical historicity. Such a characteristic stems from their contingency, and according to Laclau, for something to be historic it must be returned to the contingent conditions of its formation. (ibid.: 36)

In this way, Laclau's world is an antagonistic one. In their book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe say about the importance of this concept, "The central role of antagonism in our work is opposed to any possibility of final reconciliation, any kind of rational consensus, and an all-inclusive concept of us. For us, a non-rejectionist public space containing rational debates is a conceptual impossibility" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: XVII). They continue by

saying that antagonism is the limitation of all objectivities to a certain form of discursive presence (ibid.: 122). That is, it is an experience of the limitation of the social. In this situation, the presence of an antagonistic element prevents the completion of the identity of another element and at the same time prevents itself from reaching that totality (ibid.: 125).

The reason for this is that in Laclau's world, there is a constructive outside on which the antagonistic relationship is formed. Laclau says, the constructive outside is inherent to every antagonistic relationship (Laclau. 1990: 9). In the antagonistic world, rules and identities are *violated* and in a way we can say that "the antagonist is not a player but a cheat" (ibid.: 11). That is, instead of implementing the rules of the game, he distorts or changes them and opposes them. In Laclau's view, the discursive construction of an antagonism is different from real opposition and dialectical contradiction. Because both of these cases presuppose the existence of complete and total identities. In his view, antagonisms are not objective relations but relations that show the limitations of society to achieve an objective order. In this way, the social, which is distinct from society, always becomes a failed objectivity (Laclau 2014: 114). Because the social is the graveyard of the political and will be the end point of antagonistic competitions and the definition of identities around a universal and comprehensive thing.

This antagonism takes the form of contingency. Contingency, for him, means the affirmation and at the same time the negation of a decision at the time of decision-making. In Laclau's thought, the identity of the subject is formed when there is an antagonistic force as a constructive outside, but this constructive force itself operates in specific conditions. Laclau says, For antagonism to be able to emerge or show the contingent nature of an identity, that identity must first be present. The structure of any relationship of threat is based on the assumption of the existence and questioning of an identity at the same time (Laclau. 1990: 27). That is, an identity must exist for this antagonistic force to challenge it. He goes on to say that without the coexistence of these two moments, namely the perfection of an object and its impossibility, there would be no threat at all. Contingency, then, does not mean the existence of a negating element outside of necessity, but rather an

element of impurity that modifies or postpones the final construction of that identity (ibid). Laclau elaborates on this elsewhere. He argues that, there is no social identity that is completely immune from a discursive outside that modifies it and prevents it from being fully stitched together. Both identities and those [discursive] relations lose their characteristic of necessity (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111).

This contingency is because, for Laclau, politics is the striving for a perfect society. A society that does not exist and will never exist. In Laclau's view, a perfect society is impossible because "the imperfection of society is the main source of our political hope in the contemporary world. Because only through it can we guarantee the conditions of radical democracy" (Laclau, 1990: 82). Laclau believes that there is no limit to society. The differences between identities within society and the differences between them prevent the creation of a homogeneous society. In this way, ideas of resistance to the hegemony existing in a society are possible, and this is the characteristic that helps create politics.

Such an effort means that at some point, society achieves an identity whose continuation will be contingent. Laclau expresses this situation in this sentence of the impossible society: "If society is not totally possible, neither is it totally impossible." (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 129). Thus, the mirage of the social compels humans to turn to the political in order to achieve it. The mirage that creates the possibility of the political and, while providing the possibility of society, is also its impossibility. And this is the meaning of the impossible society. A society that is both possible and not impossible. Finally, to understand Laclau's world, it is necessary to understand the concept of hegemony. Laclau, along with Mouffe, in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, consider hegemony to be a central category in their political vision (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: X). Ernesto Laclau has repeatedly spoken of this concept in his works and has presented various meanings of it.

He says somewhere that hegemony is a movement in the stabilization of the fluid meaning of discourses. For him, the social is not only an infinite play of differences, but also an attempt to limit that play. That is, to enclose that infinity within an order. But this order, or structure,

is no longer in the form of an underlying essence for the social, but rather an unstable attempt to act on that social, that is, to hegemonize it (Laclau, 1990: 91). In another book, Laclau says, Hegemony arises in a domain where elements have not yet become moments. That is, in a system of relative identities where the meaning of any moment is fully fixed, there is no room for hegemonic action… Thus, the presupposition of hegemony is the existence of an open and incomplete social reality that can only occur in a space dependent on acts of articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 134). Elsewhere, in defining this concept, he says, hegemony means the contingent articulation of elements around specific social formations (or historical blocs) that are not predetermined by any historical philosophy and are linked to the concrete struggles of social agents (Laclau 1990: 184). He also referred to hegemony in his later works. In one case, he sees hegemony as a relationship in which a particular content, in a particular context, considers itself the embodiment of an absent fullness (Laclau, 2014: 50). Finally, as an example of a hegemonic act, Laclau considers the substitution of one form of social interrogation by another, in the most precise possible sense, as a hegemonic operation (Laclau, 1990: 162).

But what will be the status of subjects in this hegemonic world? The first thing to say about Laclau's subject is that it does not exist at all. The agents or new forms of political subjectivity are formed on the basis of possibilities in dislocated structures, and such a dislocated structure cannot determine it (Laclau, 1990: 45). In other words, the existence of the Laclau's subject is impossible. What must be said about it is the positions of subjectivity. In expressing this position of the subject using the concepts of ontic and ontological, Laclau says that there is always a discursive relationship between the two. There is no ontic content that has an ontological implication by itself, and there is no ontological implication that is not the result of an ontic investment. This distance created is precisely what Laclau calls the location of the subject. (Laclau, 2014: 119)

Oliver Marchart, in an article entitled Politics and the Ontological Difference, in Laclau, Critical Readings (2004), which he edited with Simon Critchley, argues that ontological difference is important for Laclau. For him, if we are to consider the difference

between the ontic and ontological levels, it is at the ontological level that the categories of radicality, constructive exteriority, negation, etc. exist. (Marchart. 2004: 62) He goes on to say that the real difference, which some might call the difference of the real, lies in the separation between the ontological and ontic levels, which does not allow for the level of nothingness, the radical outside. This separation only manifests itself as a rupture or dislocation within the ontic order of beings. He added "For this reason, nothingness is neither hypostatized to a black hole nor reified or reduced to the inverse category of ontic being." (ibid.: 65)

In the world depicted by Laclau, contingency is a fundamental condition. Contingency is the gift of the subject to his freedom. Laclau makes an interesting claim: "the decision based on an undecidable structure is not therefore opposed to reason, but is something which attempts to supplement its deficiencies. Thus the fact that a decision may, in the final insrance, be arbitrary merely means that the person taking it cannot establish a necessary link with e rational motive. But this does not mean that the decision is not reasonable - that is to say that an accumulated set of motives, none of which has the value of an apodicdc foundation, make it preferable to other decisions" (Laclau, 1990: 31).

The next issue regarding Laclau's subject is its identity. Identity, for Laclau, is formed when it is negated. Ernesto Laclau, in his book (Laclau 1990: 60-61), addresses the agent-structure problem. For Laclau, the existence of the subject is due to the existence of dislocations in the social structure. This dislocation is also a source of freedom, but this freedom is not a kind of positive freedom for the subject. Rather, freedom results from the failure of the structure to create identity through the process of identification. On the other hand, this process of identification or decision is itself dependent on the action of power. Power that suppresses an identity and at the same time limits itself with this repression. In this way, power is only a trace of contingency. The point at which objectivity reveals the aspect of alienation that defines it. In this case, objectivity, or objecthood, is nothing but a precipitated form of power, or in other words, power whose traces have been erased. Of course, this situation must be

considered with one condition. There is no basis for this precipitation and there is no duality between creator and creature. In this relationship between power and object, creator and creature, at the time of creation, both are created. A creation or articulation that ultimately does not reach its perfection.

Laclau (1990) then makes several statements about the subject and its relationship to structure and the main dimensions of this relationship. First, every subject is a mythical subject. For Laclau, myth is the basis for reading the existing situation and its function, the creation of the object in a hegemonic way. Myth stitches the disembodied space in the structure and places the subject in the position of subjectivity and acts as a form of identification that gives the subject that possible discursive presence. (Laclau 1990: 61). Second, the subject is, in a structuralist way, a metaphor. Laclau says that the subject, which is a lack within the structure, can only be present as a metaphor for an absent structure. In his view, between two completely constructed spaces with no common basis, there is no criterion for choice. Only when one of these spaces is dislocated can the other present itself as its mirror image. It is at this time that myth, as a metaphor, steps in under the shadow of the dialectic between absence and presence, and presents the subject as a metaphor for the absent. (ibid.: 61-63) Third, the subject's forms of identification function as inscription surfaces. If the subject is an absent whole, Laclau argues, then the concrete content of its forms of identification function as a representation of a whole. In this case, myth functions as a surface on which social dislocations and demands are inscribed. And since the most important characteristic of this surface is its incompleteness, this process of inscription becomes a permanent process of reconstruction and dislocation. (ibid.: 63) And finally, fourth, the incompleteness of the mythical surfaces of inscription is the condition of possibility for the construction of social concepts. Laclau says that, in this way, the relationship between the surface of inscription and what is inscribed is always unstable. In this situation, myth, by becoming an unlimited horizon for the inscription of every social desire and every social dislocation, becomes an imaginary. An imaginary that is an unlimited limit and the condition of the possibility of the emergence of every object. [Emphasis added] (ibid.: 63-64). Laclau goes on to say that "the

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condition of the emergence of an imaginary is the metaphorization of the literal content of a particular social demand (ibid.: 64)." Laclau continues by likening this process of creating concepts through the metaphorization of social demands to the transformation of the corporatist class into the hegemonic class in capitalist society, according to Antonio Gramsci, and sees the only difference between his thinking and Gramsci's perspective in the fact that he sees both ends of this change and transformation as present from the beginning (ibid.: 64).

The next important issue in understanding Laclau's subject is its degree of freedom. For Laclau, freedom is an intrinsic thing, as stated in the previous section in describing Laclau's world. That is, individuals are forced to be free. Because structures cannot create a fixed identity for individuals. Although these incomplete identities also turn elements into moments somewhere. But ultimately these identities have a temporary and contingent state. Laclau says about this: "I am simply thrown up in my condition as a subject. Because I have not achieved constitution as an object... I am condemned to be free not because I have no structural identity... but because I have a failed structural identity" (Laclau, 1990: 44).

But does this forced freedom mean having specific and predetermined interests? Laclau's subject has interests that are shaped by the structure. The difference is that there is the possibility of change and revision. He says, "to construct an interest is a slow historical process, which takes place throught complex ideological, discursive and institutional practices ... interests, then, are a social product and do not exist independently of the consciousness of the agents who are their bearer" (Laclau, 1990: 118).

Also, Laclau's subject has a permanent quality. We are always and continuously within a particular normative order, Laclau says, and all we can do is to dislocate, through our decisions, those areas in which that order invests morality… We live in a world of sedimented social practices that limit the range of things that can be thought of and decided upon. (Laclau, 2014: 133)

In this way, Laclau's the political occurs in a context. Because identity is inherently contextual (Laclau. 1990: 24). Laclau says that the

changes or antagonisms that arise in society are created in the context of the existing hegemony and the existing structural conditions and are not reactionary. An example of his clarifies this point. In his book, A New Reflection on the Revolution of Our Times(1990), the first part of which he considers a kind of manifesto of his ideas (ibid.: 5), he makes this issue more visible with an example of the emergence of bureaucracy in modern societies and the two liberating effects it has on society. In describing the second effect of bureaucracy, Laclau says, in addition to the first effect, namely the dismantling of former power relations, that bureaucratization becomes a power alongside other powers and makes it impossible to return to traditional social relations before bureaucratic rationalization. The struggle between the bureaucracy and its opposing social forces takes place in a completely different place, in a field opened up by bureaucratic changes. In this case, the bureaucracy will be confronted not with traditional repetitive procedures but with a range of alternative forms of rationalization (ibid.: 54). So the second effect is that new formulations are presented.

In his book *Emancipation(s)*, he provides a clearer example of the situation of specific identities in Laclau's general social space, which is temporarily articulated by hegemony. Laclau puts the problem this way. If the general space is empty, then any force can occupy it. Forces that are not necessarily democratic. To escape from this situation, we can emphasize the democratic remnants of society, which is the same Hobbesian approach to maintaining the status quo and becoming a new Leviathan. But there is another solution to this dilemma. He continues, in this new situation, which is a true democratic politics, the existence of differences is accepted, but an attempt is made to organize these differences using the logic of equivalence. As a result, differences are recognized and, along with it, an attempt is made to temporarily accept their generalization.

In this way, Laclau's subject is not very sticky. This subject, which walks in the positions of subjectivity, must redefine itself with the common equivalences in a democratic society. Otherwise, it loses the ability to reflect and discuss. In this way, in Laclau's ontology, a sticky subject is not considered. Although this subject is subject to environmental changes, its freedom of action depends on the

sediments in which it is present. The sediments that, with Laclau's words, help to transform elements into moments.

Laclau writes in a clear sentence that, we live in a world of sedimented social practices that limit the range of what is thinkable and decidable. He continues and says that the story we tell has meaning only for those who have been part of a particular history, not for the spectator who is free from that experience.(Laclau. 2014: 127-138). In this way, Laclau's radical democracy certainly excludes individuals or subjects. Individuals who are not within the framework of this democratic story are excluded from the process of change in the foundations of Laclau's radical democracy, and this is a clear proof of the existence of a political ontological foundation in Laclau's thoughts. A democratic ontology that is also observed in Rawls's thought and also finds an undisputed form in Laclau's thought.

Conclusion: The Possibility of The Islamic Political

By examining the thoughts of Rawls and Laclau as two examples of post-foundationalist thought, we realized that the changes considered by these thinkers are accepted within a specific framework. These thinkers, by announcing red lines such as reasonableness and public reason, in Rawls's conception, and hegemony and sedimentation, in Laclau's view, seek to accept changes in society. But they structure these changes within a specific framework. This framework is based on the acceptance of democratic culture as something superior in terms of political experience in societies (from Rawls's perspective) or as a sedimented culture (from Laclau's perspective). In this type of politics, subjects are considered as individuals within this framework. But change is also accepted in these societies and attempts are made to structure this variability with titles such as post-foundationalism.

Examining the thoughts of Rawls and Laclau shows us that we can use this type of perspective as a tool in structuring changes in societies. In the past, under the influence of change-oriented currents such as post-structuralism and hermeneutics, theories such as the acquisition and expansion of the Sharia were presented. Those types of theories considered change comprehensively and went so far as to reduce religious principles to the religious experiences of the prophets and the religious experiences of the prophets to the apostolic vision.

On the other hand, in the view of some, despite accepting temporal and spatial Ijtihad, the possibility of change is not recognized.

Examining ideas of Rawls and Laclau showed us that in the Western world, in order to escape the penetration of the element of change in all social aspects, including cultural and social matters, efforts have been made to accept these changes in a systematic and regular manner. Changes that provide the possibility of dialogue but also recognize red lines so that the original identity is not destroyed. The democratic ontology of these thinkers is based on secularism or liberation from the existence of God the Lord, man's reliance on reason, equality between humans in reasoning, the necessity of dialogue in solving the problems of human societies, and the changeability of the democratic world. Identifying these roots requires other materials. What we sought to understand in this article is the existence of these democratic foundations in the thoughts of those who believe in change in societies.

We can now use this experience. The Islamic political order can have elements of ontology that are defined based on the principles of the main Islamic sources. These principles, which govern the type of Islamic view of the subject and its world, can be the foundations for a political order that accepts change. A change that will not lead to the negation of the main principles. In this framework, three main rulings can be mentioned: First. God exists. A God who is the Creator, Lord, and Wise. Second. Subjects who are free and determined, at the same time, and need the guidance of that God to regulate their lives. Third. Subjects must move towards the implementation of those principles in a changing world. Principles that require interpretation and reinterpretation. And the world of subjects also provides them with the possibility of creating change, of course, within the framework.

These rules expressed in the article require further examination and are presented only as an introduction to other texts. In the previous articlepublished on this topic, the importance of ontology was mentioned. In this article, we sought a way to accept change in the framework of Islamic ontology. And in future articles, we will examine each of the elements of Islamic political ontology to ultimately determine the structure of the desirable political. In these articles, we

sought to assess the feasibility of the issue and by confirming this possibility, we can take a closer look at the elements of this possibility.

And finally, this conceptualization does not seek to reconcile The Islamic Political with The non-Islamic Political. Rather, it concludes from examining The Democratic political that the possibility of a The Complementary Political is possible. In other words, the goal is not to create harmony between the inside and the outside, but rather to expose the true nature of outside and use that exposure to define the inside. The plan to create a concept of The political from the sources of inferring religious rulings will be considered in subsequent articles.

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